£150. The yield per acre of all produce is largerin some cases very much larger-than in England. This is accounted for by the intensity of the culture of the soil of Guernsey. After giving due weight to the small difference in climate and to other considerations, Mr. Collenette sums up his very exhaustive. treatment of the subject by saying: "The real reasons of Guernsey's success are to be found in the smallness of the holdings and the energy of the men."1 Taking the opinions of the most eminent writers in every country on the subject, and the actual experience and results of the different systems of cultivation throughout the world, it is clear that if peasant farming is again to have sway in the rural economy of England, it must be based on ownership. As Adam Smith puts it: "A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little territory, who views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes pleasure not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful.”— "Wealth of Nations" (Vol. II, p. 137, 11th edition, 1805). 1 These and other notes were taken at the meeting, but the whole address, which is a lengthy one, is now printed and published in pamphlet form-"Agriculture and Horticulture," by A. Collenette, Consulting Agricultural Chemist. (Fredk. Clarke, Guernsey.) CHAPTER XVI RISKS TO THE STATE AND OTHER OBJECTIONS HAVING described the provisions of the two parts of the Land Purchase Bill (Occupying Ownership and Peasant Proprietary), it becomes necessary to see how the provisions of the Bill, if put into operation, would affect, not only the parties immediately concerned, but the interests of the general community, and also to consider some of the objections to the measure which have been put forward. It has recently been stated by a prominent member of the present Ministry that the "Land Purchase Bill would involve too great a risk to the State for the Government to undertake." It can hardly be expected that this statement will be regarded as satisfactory or final. In dealing with the question of risk there is one consideration which claims a foremost place, namely, the position of the country in the time of war. If it can be shown that the probable, or even the possible result of the operation of the Bill would be to increase the supply of home-grown food so that it would be sufficient, without supplies from abroad, to feed the people even for a few months, instead of being exhausted, as under the present system it would be, in as many weeks, then, from the point of view of national defence alone it would be a wise policy for the State to take any small money risk which may be involved in carrying out the measure. The State has already, in the case of Ireland, undertaken a liability for an amount at least ten times as great as that named in the Bill. It has done this, not for the love of any one class, but in the public interest, with the object of securing, or attempting to secure, contentment and prosperity in Ireland. It would seem but fair that the English farmer should have at least some of the advantages and opportunities so liberally conferred on the Irish tenant. A Parliamentary Return states that the total estimated purchase-money of estates sold or offered for sale to the Irish Commissioners up to 18 March, 1905, was £19,115,830.1 In order to quicken the sales of land to tenants Mr. Walter Long has made such liberal terms with the Treasury as will secure that at the end of 1906 the British Government will have advanced 23 millions sterling for the purposes of the Irish Act of 1903. While this is being done for Ireland we are told that to advance the comparatively small sum named in the Land Purchase Bill for the benefit of English tenants "would involve too great a risk to the State." Of course there are risks connected with every undertaking, and in this, as in the Irish case, whatever risks there are will rest with the State alone. But experience shows that these risks are infinitesimal. The many thousands of Irish tenants who have bought their farms under the purchase clauses of the various Irish Land Acts, have punctually paid their instalments. After many years' experience, the loss to the State up to now has been too trifling to be taken into It is not for a moment to be held that the account. 1 6 Report of the Estates Commissioners" (1905), Cd. 2471. British farmer is less able or less honest than the Irish. But take the worst possibility. Suppose that adversity overtakes an occupying owner, and he is obliged to sell his farm, and that, times being bad, the price realized is low. The farm is bought by a purchaser, no matter how low the price, subject to payment of the instalments, and that is all the State is concerned with. So long as the instalments are paid, the State receives interest for capital advanced, and the sinking fund is operating with the effect that every year's payment diminishes the amount owing. The debt to the State is lessening, while the security remains the same; that is, a first charge on the holding till every farthing is paid off. It is not like advancing money on commercial undertakings which are liable to a failure involving total loss. The security here-with a yearly increasing margin-is on the land, and that ever remains. Putting aside, therefore, the Irish precedent, it is difficult to see how the argument that the Bill "would involve too great a risk to the State" can be fairly maintained. With regard to the farmer, seeing that the whole of the purchase-money is advanced, he risks none of his capital. Every year's instalment which he pays, instead of being mere rent, goes to increase the value (to him) of the holding, and all the improvements he may make are his own. It is frequently urged that the State would be a "harsh landlord," and could not, like an ordinary landowner, postpone the payment of a year's rent on account of bad seasons or other valid cause. First of all, the State, under the Bill, would neither be a landlord, nor have the powers and rights of a landlord. The State would be simply the receiver, for a limited time, of well-secured charges. These charges may be called quit-rents, to which a large number of freeholds are permanently subject. But to meet the case referred to (which ought to be met), the Bill names no definite number of years at the end of which the repayment of the advance must be completed. To do so would be to make it imperative that each year's instalment should be promptly paid. The Board of Agriculture, therefore, could, and no doubt would, on good cause being shown-such as an exceptionally bad season or a special outlay on improvements -give the required relief, and would not incur the slightest risk in doing so. The English farmer has so long been in the position of a mere tenant, that he has become more or less accustomed to the sort of feudatory subjection which that position necessarily involves. He has learnt too much to see eye to eye with the landlord, to be dependent on his will, and to put up with the "good understanding" on which, as a yearly tenant, he has mainly to rely. Sir James Caird, in a sentence already quoted, declared some years ago that this "good understanding" could not remain for long a sufficient protection for the British farmer. This opinion he gave "with the responsibility of forty years and with a general knowledge, both personally and officially, of the agriculture of the United Kingdom, and of the relations between landlord and tenant." It is evident that a mere "understanding" must be unsatisfactory as regards a business in which the interests of parties are so opposed and their powers so |