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of any evil spirit to convey to us, concerning a delusi- SERM. on; or if it be in his power, he is not permitted to in do it to any who have not highly provoked God, by rejecting the truth, " to give them up to strong de"lusions, to believe lies:" and that such persons should be obnoxious to fuch delusions, as it is not unjust in reference to them, so neither is it any prejudice to the affurance which good men may have of such revelations, which are truly and really divine.

But for the other ways of difcerning true revelati-> on from falfe, which the Jews mention; as that the Spirit of God always works upon the understanding, as well as the imagination, and in consequence with the use of reason and understanding, and gives fome ** sensible notice of it's seizing upon men, I think all -- these to be uncertain, if they be examined. And if the last which they mention, viz. this that I have insisted upon, be true, all the other are fuperfluous. For ewhat need any other sign to assure a man that that is a divine revelation, which carries along with it a clear fatisfaction and full assurance that it is such?

So that it remains now, that we fix upon some particular ways, whereby the person, that hath a di-' vine revelation, may be assured of it; and this I shall do by these propofitions....

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First, that God can work in the mind of a man a firm perfuafion of a thing, by giving him a clear and vigorous perception of it; and if so, then God can accompany his own revelations with such a clear and overpowering light as shall discover to us the divinity of them, and fatisfy us thereof beyond all doubt and scruple. And this no man can doubt of, that confi-' ders the vast power and influence which God, who made the foul of man, and perfectly knows the frame of it, must needs have upon the mind and under- standing of man. Secondly,

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Secondly, GOD never perfuades a man of any thing CCXXI. that contradicts the natural and essential notions of

his mind and understanding. For this would be to destroy his own workmanship, and to impose that upon the understanding of a man, which whilst it retains it's own nature, and remains what it is, it cannot poffibly admit. For instance, we cannot imagine that God can perfuade any man that there is no GoD: for he that believes any thing as from God, must necessarily believe there is a Gop; therefore it is impoffible that he can be perfuaded of this as from GoD, that there is no GOD, and that he is not wife and just, and good and powerful; and that he is not to be honoured and loved by all reasonable creatures: because these do clearly and immediately contradict the most essential and fundamental notions of our minds concerning God, and the respect which is due to him: not only because it is unworthy of God to go about to perfuade a man of a falfhood; but because it is impossible in the nature of the thing, that the mind of man, which is naturally prepossest with contrary notions, should, whilst it retains it's own nature, admit of such as do clearly and immediately contradict them. For if these be natural notions, that there is a God, that he must be wife and juft, and good and powerful, and ought to be honoured and loved by his creatures; the mind of man cannot possibly admit of any contrary perfuafions and impreffions: for the former perfuafions being natural to us, will always remain while our nature remains; and if any perfuafions contrary to these could be wrought upon our minds, they would fignify nothing, but would mutually deftroy one another. For if any man, that is perfuaded that God is good (as every man is, that is perfuaded he is at all) could during the perfuafion

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be likewife of a contrary perfuafion, that he is not SERM. good; this latter perfuafion would fignify nothing: for he is not perfuaded that God is not good, whilft he retains this perfuafion that he is good.

Thirdly, supposing the thing revealed do not con tradict the essential notions of our minds, no good and holy man hath reason to doubt of any thing, whether it be a revelation from God or not, of which he hath a clear and vigorous perception, and full fatiffaction in his own mind that it is such. For if a man may have reason to doubt of any thing, whereof he hath a clear perception, then no man can be certain of any thing. Now that there is such a thing as certainty, is now supposed, and not to be proved. I fay, a good and holy man can have no reason to doubt : for a wicked man (I grant) may, by a sinful rejection of, and disobedience to the truth, so far provoke GOD, as "to give him up to strong delusions, to believe " lies;" and he may be as confident of a lie, as any good man is of the truth.

And as this is not unjust from God in reference to wicked men, so it is not prejudice to the assurance which good men may have concerning a divine revelation.

Fourthly, a good and holy man reflecting upon this assurance and perfuafion that he hath, may be able to give himself a reasonable account of it, and fatisfy himself that it is not a stubborn belief and an obstinate conceit of things without any ground or reafon. A good man is secretly and within himself perfuaded, that God hath revealed to him such a thing; reflecting upon this perfuafion, he finds that it is a foreign impression, and doth not spring from his own mind: now he believing that there is a God, who can, and probably doth communicate and reveal himVOL XI.

felf

SER M.self to the minds of good men; and being withal faCCXXI. tisfied that his goodness is such, that he will not fuf

fer good men, who do heartily and fincerely defire to know his will, to be under a necessity of delufion (which they unavoidably are, if they then may be deceived, when they have the greatest assurance and clearest fatisfaction, that fuch a thing is revealed to them of God;) from hence he reasonably concludes, that he ought not to question the matter any farther. I might instance in the revelation made to Abraham, concerning the facrificing of his fon, which hath the greatest difficulty in it of any cafe I know of: but of that I have elsewhere discoursed at large *. Thus much for the first.

Secondly, what assurance can other perfons, who have not the revelation immediately made to them, have of a divine revelation? To this I shall answer by these propofitions:

1. That there are fome means whereby a man may be affured of another's revelation that it is divine. For, (1.) Otherwise it would signify nothing, but only to the person that immediately had it; which would make void the chief end of most revelations, which are seldom made to particular persons for their own fakes only, but for the most part, on purpose that they may be made known to others, which could not effectually be done, unless there be fome means whereby men may be assured of revelations made to another.

(2.) None could be guilty of unbelief but those who had immediate revelation made to them. For no man is guilty of unbelief that is not obliged to believe: but no man can be under an obligation to believe any thing, who hath not fufficient means whereby he may be affured that such a thing is true.

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2. The private assurance and fatisfaction of ano-SERM. ther concerning a revelation made to him, can fignify nothing at all to me, to assure me of it. For what fatisfaction is it to me, that another may say, he hath a revelation, unless I have some means to be assured that what he says is true? For if I must believe every spirit, that is, every man that says he is inspired, I lie open to all poffible impostures and delusions, and must believe every one that either foolishly conceits, or falsely pretends that he hath a revelation: for both the conceited and pretended enthusiast will say they have revelations, with as much confidence as those who are truly and divinely inspired: and to take every man's word in matters of fuch huge consequence and importance, as revelation from GOD ought to be presumed to be, would not be faith, but credulity, that is, an ungrounded perfuafion; which how feverely God punished, you may fee in

that famous instance, 1 Kings xiii. where the prophet For that was sent to Bethel, is upon his return torn in pieces by a lion, because of his credulity and easy belief of a pretended revelation. I confess this case is somewhat different from theirs who simply believe a pretended revelation, as being complicated with fome other aggravating circumstances. For he had had an immediate revelation from GOD, "not to eat, nor " drink at Bethel; nor to return the fame way that " he came :" upon his return an old prophet meets him, and tells him that an angel had appeared to him, and had bid him bring him back, and to cause him to eat and drink; he believes him, and turns in with him. Now this was the aggravation of his credulity, that when he himself had had an express revalation from GOD, concerning which he was satisfied, he hearkned to the pretended revelation of another, concerning

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