CCXXII. I. That infallibility is not essential to divine faith, SERM. and neceffarily included in the notion of it; which I prove thus. Divine faith admits of degrees, as I have shewed before: but there can be no degree of infallibility. Infallibility is an impossibility of being deceived, but there are no degrees of impoffibility; one thing is not more impoffible than another; but all things that are impossible, are equally fo. 2. That the assurance which we have of the miracles wrought for the confirmation of the gospel, is not an infallible assurance. I fhewed before that there are three ways whereby we may be affured of matter of fact, such as the working of miracles is. First, by our own fenfes. Secondly, by the report of credible witness. Thirdly, by credible history. But none of these ways give us infallible assurance. That it is poffible our senses may deceive us, I think no body will deny; and if fo, then the teftimony of witnesses, and the report of history, which likewife depends originally upon senses, may deceive us. I do not know a fourth way whereby we may be affured of matter of fact. 3. That an undoubted afsurance of a divine revelation, that it is such, is as much as in reason can be expected. I deny not but that a divine revelation is an infallible ground of faith; because whatever God says is infallible true, and a faith built upon, a divine revelation would be infallible, if we could be infallibly affured that it is a divine revelation; but that we cannot be without another divine revelation to assure us infallibly that this is one, and that other would require a third, and so without end, which being absurd and unreasonable, it remains that an infallible assurance of a divine revelation is impoffible; P2 SERM.ble; and consequently, that we can have no more CCXXII, than an undoubted assurance, and this is as much as in reason we can expect to have; for it is unreason able to expect that we should have any greater afsu rance that such a revelation is from God, than we have that there is a God; because that there is a God, is the first and most fundamental principle of religion, and it is unreasonable to expect greater affurance of any thing in religion, than we have of that which is the first principle of it. And indeed it is impossible; for no man can be infallibly assured, that a revelation is from God, unless he be first infallibly affured that there is a God, but no man hath more than undoubted afsurance that there is a GOD. No man pretends to a divine revelation that there is a God; but only to have rational fatisfaction of it, fuch as leaves no just or reasonable cause to doubt of it. And why then should any defire greater afsurance of a divine revelation, than he hath of God? 4. An undoubted assurance is sufficient to conftitute a divine faith. Mark xvi. 14. it is faid, "CHRIST " upbraided his disciples with their unbelief; because " they believed not them who had feen him after he " was risen." Suppose now the disciples had believed, which they ought to have done; this faith of theirs would have been a truly divine faith; but by no means infallible. For that cannot be an infallible faith which is built but upon fallible grounds: now the ground upon which they ought to have believed, was the report of credible witnesses; but the report of credible witnesses is by no means infallible: it is indeed undoubted, for I have no reason to doubt of a credible report; for that is credible which I have juft cause to believe; but I can have no just cause to doubt of that which I have just cause to believe. As As an undoubted assurance is sufficient to confti- SERM. tute a divine faith, so it is sufficient to all the ends - to this end. Do not men venture their estates in traffic to places they never faw, because they have it from credible persons, that there are such places; and they have no reason to doubt their teftimony: and why should not the fame assurance serve us in greater matters; if an undoubted assurance of a lesser benefit and advantage will make men venture as much, why should any man defire greater assurance of any thing, than to have no just reason to doubt of it; why more than so much as the thing is capable of? I cannot possibly understand, why every man should not be contented with fufficient assurance, or for what reason a man should defire more than enough; and why a man should not be fatisfied that a thing is so, when he hath as great afsurance of it, and as good evidence for it, as he could have, supposing it were. 15. r And for men to say, nothing less than infallible afsurance can fatisfy a man's mind, that men will always doubt so long as there is a possibility of the contrary, and there will be a possibility of the contrary, until we have infallible assurance, is as unreafonable as can be imagined. I ask any man, whether he be infallibly assured that there was such a man as William the Conqueror? or that there is such a country as Spain ? If he say he is, I ask, where is his infallible evidence for this? He will cite several historians: P3 SERM. hiftorians: but all this is human teftimony, and that CCXXII. is fallible. It seems then he is not infallibly certain there was such a man, or there is such a country; and confequently there is a possibility of the contrary. 'Tis granted there is: But is any fober man unfatisfied in his mind about these things? "I would fain meet with the man, that will tell me in good earneft, that he hath reason to doubt, whether there was such a man, or not; and whether there be such a place as Spain, or not? So that it is fond for any man to alledge a bare possibility of the contrary, as a reafonable cause of doubting concerning any thing, for which we have as good evidence as the thing is capable of. ية Upon these grounds we can easily resolve our faith. We believe the doctrine of christian religion, because it is revealed by God; we believe it to be revealed by Gon, because it was confirmed by unquestionable miracles; we believe fuch miracles were wrought, because we have as great afsurance of this, as any matter of fact, at such a distance from the time it was done, is capable of. Now if the papifts fay, this doth at least amount to no more than moral afsurance; I grant it doth not': but then I have proved this affurance to be as much as in reason can be expected, and as much as is fufficient to the nature and ends of a divine faith, and that an infallible assurance is not agreeable to a human understanding; but an incommunicable attribute and preroga tive of the divine nature, which whoever pretends to, he hath not the modefty of a creature, but does by a facrilegious ambition attempt the throne of God, and equal himself to the most High. And therefore it is no wonder that the popes of Rome, after they had once affirmed to themselves to be in fal 1 CCXXII. fallible, did presently arrogate to themselves the titles SERM. of God, there being such strict connexion between the attribute of infallibility, and the divine nature, that whoever challengeth the first, may with equal reason claim the other. : I shall only add this, that nothing hath been more pernicious to christian religion, than the vain pretence of men to greater afsurance concerning things relating to it, than they can make good; the mifchief of which is this; that when difcerning and inquisitive men find that men pretend to greater matters than they can prove, this makes them doubt of all they say, and to call in question the truth of chriftianity itself. Whereas if men would be contented to speak juftly of things, and pretend to no greater affurance than they can bring evidence for; confiderate men would be apt to believe them. Every knowing man being more ready to listen to a modest man, whose confidence bears a proportion to the reafons and arguments he brings for what he says, thân to a confident pretender, who calls every weak faying a demonstration. And indeed such men are but justly dealt withal, since the experience of the world hath sufficiently taught us, that usually those who speak modeftly of things are furnished with the best arguments for their affertions; and that those who have made the strongest pretences to infallibility in any thing, have the weakest reasons for what they have faid; of which this account may be given, that good reasons and arguments are requisite to beget in a man a rational assurance; but a strong conceit is fufficient to beget in men an opinion of infallibility. VI. What is the proper and genuine effect of this faith of a divine revelation? I answer: a compliance with the design and intention of it. |