CCXXII. 1. That infallibility is not effential to divine faith, S ER M. and neceffarily included in the notion of it; which I prove thus. Divine faith admits of degrees, as I have fhewed before: but, there can be no degree of infallibility. Infallibility is an impoffibility of being deceived; but there are no degrees of impoffibility; one thing is not more impoffible than another; but all things that are impoffible, are equally fo. 2. That the affurance which we have of the miracles wrought for the confirmation of the gospel, is not an infallible affurance. I fhewed before that there are three ways whereby we may be affured of matter of fact, fuch as the working of miracles is. First, by our own fenfes. Secondly, by the report of credible witnefs. Thirdly, by credible hiftory. But none of these ways give us infallible affurance. That it is poffible. our fenfes may deceive us, I think no body will deny; and if fo, then the teftimony of witneffes, and the report of hiftory, which likewife depends originally upon fenfes, may deceive us. I do not know a fourth way whereby we may be affured of matter of fact. 3. That an undoubted affurance of a divine revelation, that it is fuch, is as much as in reason can be expected. I deny not but that a divine revelation is an infallible ground of faith; becaufe whatever GOD fays is infallible true, and a faith built upon a divine revelation would be infallible, if we could be infallibly affured that it is a divine revelation; but that we cannot be without another divine revelation to affure us infallibly that this is one, and that other would require a third, and fo without end, which being abfurd and unreasonable, it remains that an infallible affurance of a divine revelation is impoffiP 2 ble; CCXXII. SERM.ble; and confequently, that we can have no more than an undoubted affurance; and this is as much as in reason we can expect to have; for it is unreasonable to expect that we fhould have any greater affurance that fuch a revelation is from GoD, than we have that there is a GOD; because that there is a GOD, is the first and most fundamental principle of religion, and it is unreasonable to expect greater af furance of any thing in religion, than we have of that which is the first principle of it. And indeed it is impoffible; for no man can be infallibly affured, that a revelation is from God, unless he be first infallibly affured that there is a GOD, but no man hath more than undoubted affurance that there is a GOD. No man pretends to a divine revelation that there is a GOD; but only to have rational fatisfaction of it, fuch as leaves no juft or reasonable caufe to doubt of it. And why then fhould any defire greater affurance of a divine revelation, than he hath of GOD? 4. An undoubted affurance is fufficient to conftitute a divine faith. Mark xvi. 14. it is faid, "CHRIST "upbraided his difciples with their unbelief; because 66 they believed not them who had feen him after he "was rifen." Suppofe now the difciples had believed, which they ought to have done; this faith of theirs would have been a truly divine faith; but by no means infallible. For that cannot be an infallible faith which is built but upon fallible grounds: now the ground upon which they ought to have believed, was the report of credible witneffes; but the report of credible witneffes is by no means infallible: it is indeed undoubted, for I have no reafon to doubt of a credible report; for that is credible which I have juft cause to believe; but I can have no juft caufe to doubt of that which I have juft caufe to believe. As As an undoubted affurance is fufficient to confti- SER M. CCXXII. tute a divine faith, fo it is fufficient to all the ends and purposes of a divine faith. To inftance in the faith of the promises of eternal life. What is the end and defign of this faith, but to encourage our obedience, and make us continue in it, notwithstanding the hazard of any thing in this world? Now I fay, an undoubted affurance is abundantly fufficient to this end. Do not men venture their eftates in traffic to places they never faw, because they have it from credible perfons, that there are fuch places; and they have no reafon to doubt their teftimony: and why should not the fame affurance ferve us in Ggreater matters; if an undoubted affurance of a leffer benefit and advantage will make men venture as much, why should any man defire greater affurance of any thing, than to have no juft reafon to doubt of it; why more than fo much as the thing is capable of? I cannot poffibly understand, why every man fhould not be contented with fufficient affurance, or for what reafon a man fhould defire more than enough; and why a man should not be fatisfied that a thing is fo, when he hath as great affurance of it, and as good evidence for it, as he could have, supposing it were. is t And for men to fay, nothing lefs than infallible affurance can fatisfy a man's mind, that men will always doubt fo long as there is a poffibility of the contrary, and there will be a poffibility of the contrary, until we have infallible affurance, is as unreafonable as can be imagined. I ask any man, whether he be infallibly affured that there was fuch a man as William the Conqueror? or that there is fuch a country as Spain? If he fay he is, I afk, where is his infallible evidence for this? He will cite several hiftorians: P 3 30 SER M. hiftorians: but all this is human teftimony, and that CCXXII is fallible. is fallible. It feems then he is not infallibly certain there was such a man, or there is fuch a country; and confequently there is a poffibility of the contrary. 'Tis granted there is: But is any fober man unfatisfied in his mind about these things? I would fain meet with the man, that will tell me in good earneft, that he hath reafon to doubt, whether there was fuch a man, or not; and whether there be fuch a place as Spain, or not? So that it is fond for any man to alledge a bare poffibility of the contrary, as a reafonable cause of doubting concerning any thing, for which we have as good evidence as the thing is caFable of. Upon thefe grounds we can easily refolve our faith. We believe the doctrine of chriftian religion, because it is revealed by GOD; we believe it to be revealed by GoD, becaufe it was confirmed by unqueftionable miracles; we believe fuch miracles were wrought, becaufe we have as great affurance of this, as any matter of fact, at fuch a diftance from the time it was done, is capable of. Now if the papifts fay, this doth at leaft amount to no more than moral affurance; I grant it doth not: but then I have proved this affurance to be as much as in reafon can be expected, and as much as is fufficient to the nature and ends of a divine faith, and that' an infallible affurance is not agreeable to a human understanding; but an incommunicable attribute and preroga tive of the divine nature, which whoever pretends to, he hath not the modefty of a creature, but does by a facrilegious ambition attempt the throne of GOD, and equal himfelf to the moft High. And therefore it is no wonder that the popes of Rome, after they had once affirmed to theilelves to be in fal CCXXII. fallible, did presently arrogate to themselves the titles S ER M. of GOD, there being fuch strict connexion between the attribute of infallibility, and the divine nature, that whoever challengeth the first, may with equal reafon claim the other. I fhall only add this, that nothing hath been more pernicious to chriftian religion, than the vain pretence of men to greater affurance concerning things relating to it, than they can make good; the mifchief of which is this; that when difcerning and inquifitive men find that men pretend to greater matters than they can prove, this makes them doubt of all they fay, and to call in queftion the truth of chriftianity itself. Whereas if men would be contented tỏ fpeak juftly of things, and pretend to no greater affurance than they can bring evidence for; confiderate men would be apt to believe them. Every knowing man being more ready to liften to a modeft man, whofe confidence bears a proportion to the reafons and arguments he brings for what he fays, than to a confident pretender, who calls every weak faying a demonftration. And indeed fuch men are but juftly dealt withal, fince the experience of the world hath fufficiently taught us, that ufually thofe who fpeak modeftly of things are furnished with the best arguments for their affertions; and that thofe who have made the strongest pretences to infallibility in any thing, have the weakest reafons for what they have faid; of which this account may be given, that good reafons and arguments are requifite to beget in a man a rational affurance; but a ftrong conceit is fufficient to beget in men an opinion of infallibility. VI. What is the proper and genuine effect of this faith of a divine revelation? I anfwer: a compliance with the defign and intention of it. |