Nor have we any reason in the mean time to think, that God will put a stop to temporal judgments; but that if we be not reformed by all those terrible things which our eyes have seen, God will punish us yet seven times more for our sins. If we still perfist in our atheism and profaneness, in our contempt of God and his worship, in our abominable lufts and impieties; what can we look for, but greater judgments, and a more fiery indignation to confume us and our habitations?

Methinks nothing is a fadder presage of greater caJamities, and a more fearful ruin yet to befal us, than that we have hitherto been so little reformed by those loud and thick vollies of judgments which have already been thundered out upon us. This was that which at last brought so terrible a destruction upon the E. gyptians, that they were hardened under ten plagues. To be impenitent under the judgments of God, which are so mercifully designed to reclaim and reform us, is to poifon ourselves with that which was intended for our physick, and by a miraculous kind of obftinacy, to turn the rods of God into ferpents. O that we were wife, that we understood this, and that we would consider our latter end!

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SER 257

SERMON CCLV.

Preached at the morning-exercise at Cripplegate.

MATTH. vii. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men hould do to you, do ye even so to them; for this

is the Law and the Prophets.

[The following sermon, which was preached by the late Archbishop Tillotson about the year 1660, before he conformed to the church of England, is now reprinted at the desire of several Gentlemen, who have a great regard to the memory of so great a person; who also judge from the importance of the subject, that it ought to be rescued from that oblivion it lies under, while it is only in the morning-exercises.]

THESE words being brought in by way of inference from something said before, we

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must look back a little to find out the relation of them to the former verses. At the seventh verse Christ commands to ask of God those things which we want; to encourage us to ask, he promises we should receive; to induce us to believe this promise, he puts a temporal cafe :: Our earthly fathers, who are evil, give us good things when we ask them, how much more easily may we believe this of a good God of infinite goodness ? Now as we defire God should give us those things we ask, so we should do to others, and not only so, but universally in all other things, what we would that men should do to us, that we should do to others. That men should do unto you; though the perfons be expressed, yet we may take it imperfonally, by an usuall

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usual Hebraifm, as if it had been faid, Whatever you would should be done unto you; leaving the perfon to be supplied in the largest sense: Thus, Whatever you would should be done unto you by God or men. This is the Law and the Prophets, i. e. This is the sum of the Old Testament, so far as concerns our duty to our neighbour.

The obfervation which ariseth from the words is this:

The great rule of equity in all our dealings with men is this, To do as we would be done unto. This rule hath been otherwise expressed, but not more emphatically in any other form of words than this here in the text. Mat. xxii. 39. Love thy neighbour as thyself: This requires that we should bear the fame affection to our neighbour, which we would have him bear to us; but the rule in the text exprefly requires that we should do the same offices to others, which we would have then do to us. Severus the Emperor (as the historian Lampridius tells us) did learn this rule of Christians, and did much reverence Christ and Chriftianity for it, but he exprefsed it negatively, Quod tibi non vis, alteri ne feceris: Now this forbids us to do injuries to others, but doth not so exprefly command us to do kindnesses and courtefies.

In speaking to this rule, I shall give you,
I. The explication of it.

II. The grounds of it.

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III. The instances wherein we ought principally to practise it.

I. For the explication, the meaning of it is this: Put thyself into the cafe and circumstances of every man with whom thou hast to do, that is, fuppofe thou wert he, and as he is, and he were thyself, and as thou art, that then which thou wouldst defire he should do to thee, that do thou to him; and that which thou wouldst be unwilling he should do to thee, do not thou to him. Now this is an exact rule, for we are very curious in determining our own privileges, and what duty others owe to us; just so much as we take to ourselves, we must allow to others

thers; what we expect from others when we are in such circumstances, we must do the same to them in the like. And this is a plain and easy rule. Many men cannot tell what is law, or justice, or right in such a cafe ; many cannot deduce the laws of nature one from another : but there is no man but can tell what it is he would have another man do to him; every man can take his own actions, and put them into the other scale, and suppose, if this that I do now to another were to be done to me, should I like it? Should I be pleased and contented with it? And thus by changing the scale, his own felf-love, and self-interest, and other paffions, will add nothing to the weight; for that self-interest which makes a man covetous, and inclines him to wrong another man for his own advantage, makes him likewife (when the scales are changed) unwilling that another man should wrong him: That self-conceit which makes a man proud, and apt to scorn and despise others, makes him unwilling that another should contemn him...

I question not but by this time you understand the meaning of the rule; but we are not yet past all difficulties about it: Three things are to be done, before this rule will be of use to us.

1. We must make it appear, that it is reasonable. 2. Make it. certain, for for till it be certain it cannot

be a rule.

3. Make it practicable.

1. We must make it appear to be reasonable. The difficulty about the reasonableness of it is this: Ac cording to this rule I shall be obliged to do that ma ny times which is sinful, and to omit that which is a neceffary duty. I will give two or three instances: Saul would have had his armour-bearer to have killed him; might he therefore have killed his armourbearer, if he had been willing, and had defired. it? I may not be an instrument or furtherer of another man's fin, though I were so wicked as to defire that another would be so to me. If I were a child, I would not have my father correct me; or a malefactor, I would not have the magiftrate cut me off: must must there therefore be no correction or punishment ? Now because of these, and the like instances which may be given, the rule is necessarily to be understood of things that may be done or omitted, i. e. which are not unlawful or unreasonable. Saul might not kill his armour-bearer; I may not further another man's fin in the cases propounded, because these things may not be done, they are morally impoffible, that is, unlawful. A parent or magistrate may not wholly omit correction or punishment, because fuch omiffion would tend to the ruin of good manners, and of human society.

2. We must make the rule certain. The difficulty about the certainty of it is this: Everlasting difputes will arise about what is lawful and reasonable, and unlawful and unreasonable. Now we must reduce it to a certainty thus: Whatever I would that another should do to me, that I should do to him, unless the thing be plainly and evidently unlawful or unreasonable. And this cuts off all difputes : For though there may be perpetual disputes about what is lawful and reasonable, or the contrary, yet there can be no dispute about the unlawfulness and unreafonableness of those things which are plainly and evidently fo; for that which is plain and evident, is out of all difpute.. To confirm this, let us confider another text, Phil. iv. 8. where the Apostle exhorts Christians to follow whatever things are true, and honest, and just, and pure; and as a difcovery of what things are fuch, he adds, whatever things are Lovely, of good report, and praise-worthy; that is, whatever things are amiable, well spoken of, and praised by wife and good men (who are the only competent judges of these things) if they be not plainly contrary to truth, or honesty, or justice, or purity, follow these things and if this be not the meaning, those words, lovely, of good report, praise worthy, are superfluous, and do not at all direct our conversation, which certainly the Apostle intended to do by them.

3. We must make it practicable. There are two things which make the practice of it difficult.:

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