Once a quarter there is a general audit and "equalization". of funds among the different branches. That is to say, the balance of the income of each branch over its authorized expenditure is added into the general reserve of the society, and this reserve is divided out among the different branches in proportion to their numbers; so that, with the exception of a few extraordinary local levies, all the income of each branch is paid into the common purse, and no payments can be made from this purse except by the authority of the whole union. Thus a large union has all the strength of an organized republic, in which the most intelligent members are sure of having their opinions heard, but in which every important step is ruled by the votes of the whole body. It is daily becoming more true that the "higgling and bargaining" which determine market fluctuations of wages, are not between individual employers and individual men, but between a group of employers and a group of men,

§ 6. The total number of unionists is about 1,250,000; and more than half of these are represented at the Trades-union, Congress that is now held every year in some large town. The discussions at these Congresses have a very wide range; but their action is almost confined to pursuing the original aim of the union, that of influencing legislation in matters that specially affect working men.

A proposal has been made to organize a general federation of unions for active purposes: but there seems to be no probability of this being done, unless as a defensive measure in case the "National Federation of Employers" should become strong. In almost every large town there is a Trades Council elected by the local unions and branches of unions. They have little power, but they take action in some matters of general interest; and they sometimes arbitrate between different unions. When one union wants aid from others in carrying on a strike, the local Trades Council generally investigate the case; and either collect subscriptions for the strikers, or recommend them to close the strike on the best terms that can be got.

§ 7. Though unions do not yet contain nearly half the working men in the country, they do contain more than half of the most skilful and intelligent and steady workers in almost every skilled trade. There are no doubt some energetic men, anxious to raise themselves in life, who find the rules of a union burdensome. But more are excluded from unions because they are below the union's standard of efficiency as workmen, or because they are unwilling to subscribe to its funds.

It may be well to inquire how it is that unions have so strong a hold on the best workmen. Firstly, as in the days of the old gilds, men delight in the notion of self-help and

self-defence by union. The best employers admit that if the unions never allowed their policy to be influenced by mean men and shirks, they would do very little harm: and the best unionists admit that if there were no unjust or harsh employers, unions might become mere benefit-societies; as it is, many feel their duty to their union to be a kind of patriotism. Again, nonunionists very often enter into a strike as heartily as unionists; but having no resources of their own, consent to be supported by the union and when the strike is over those of them who have any honourable feeling join the union. Lastly, unions get a powerful hold on those working men who dread nothing so much as becoming dependent on the parish. For it can promise to maintain a man comfortably whenever he is out of work. But any provident society which did not consist of men in the same trade with himself, would fail if it attempted to do this: for it could not test the truth of his statement when he said that he could not get work at a reasonable wage.

§ 8. Next with regard to the cost of strikes. We may add together into one sum all the expenses incurred by working men in strikes, including the wages lost while they were idle. We may add together into another sum all the wages they have gained directly by strikes, whenever these have been successful in obtaining a rise and preventing a fall of wages. We shall then certainly find that the former sum is very much larger than the latter. But this does not prove that strikes cost more to working men than the benefits gained by them are worth. It would be as reasonable to argue that the £16,000,000 which England spent on the Abyssinian war was badly spent, because we brought back from it very little booty except King Theodore's umbrella. Whether the expenditure was prudent or not, depends on the very difficult question whether it was worth £16,000,000 to give one more hint that other nations may not illtreat a British subject with impunity. And the unionists maintain that their expenditure is prudent because it makes employers feel that they cannot lower wages or harass their men wantonly without a risk of suffering for it. The function of an army is not to make war, but to preserve a satisfactory peace; war is a proof that the army has failed of its first object. And though there is always a war party in a union, its cooler and abler members know that to declare a strike is to confess failure. The number of strikes would be diminished if all unionists reflected that six years' work at a rise of a shilling a week is required to balance the loss of ten weeks' wages at thirty shillings a week.

But many strikes are not part of a deliberate policy; and in fact the trade quarrels of the smaller unions, as of the gilds of old days, have been far more often caused by irritated personal or class feelings, than by disputes about wages. The

organization of the larger unions generally enables them to prevent a personal quarrel from maturing into a strike.

§ 9. Let us next look at the chief rules in which the policy of the unions is embodied. The restless changes of modern industry make it very difficult to enforce strict regulations as to apprentices. This is perhaps the most important matter which most unions find it best to leave to be decided by local trade custom. No doubt a system of apprenticeships supplemented by a good system of technical schools, may greatly promote the education of the country; provided that the apprentice is put to work under a man who is paid to teach him, or who is in some way interested in making him a good workman, and that the apprenticeship rules are not used as a means of artificially limiting the numbers of those who are brought up to skilled occupations. We have seen that one of the chief causes of the origin of unions was the belief that the masters were flooding their factories with apprentices, who, when their service was over, could not get employment at any reasonable wage; and perhaps a few cases of the kind now exist. But there can be no justification for such rules as that which the boiler-makers profess to enforce, viz. that there shall be only one apprentice to every five journeymen, or the still severer rules of the hatters. If such a rule were acted on generally by the skilled trades of England, the proportion of skilled labourers to unskilled would steadily grow less. In spite of the improvements in the arts of production, the total produce of industry would increase but slowly or would diminish; the improvement in the intelligence and the income of the average English workman would be stopped; and compared with other countries, where such restrictions were not known, England would become poor and ignorant. It seems however that a candidate for admission to a union is seldom asked for his indentures, even where they might be called for under the rules; and that scarcely 10 per cent. of those now admitted as members of trades unions have been properly apprenticed1.

§ 10. Trades-unions aim at enabling the men in the trade to bargain as one compact body with their employers. They have generally decided that this end cannot be attained, without their insisting that, if wages are paid by time, there must be in each district a minimum rate of wage, that is a rate below which no member of the union may work till the rule is altered; and that if wages are paid by the piece, a detailed tariff for such payments must be agreed upon.

Firstly with regard to payment by time. Beginners, sick men, and old men are often allowed to work for less than the

1 Howell, ch. V. § 71.

fixed rate but if the union as a body is to make any bargain about the day's wages, there must be some rate fixed for the time as a minimum rate for those who cannot shew that they are an exceptional case. Of course a specially able man may earn more than this rate. This minimum is not the same in all parts of the country; and some unions publish in their annual reports a statement of the current rate of wages in every district in which they have a lodge. For instance, the carpenters in 1873 report 20s. a week at Barnstaple and Taunton, about 28s. at Bristol, 28s. or 30s. at various northern towns and 37s. at London. Where the wages are high, the standard of efficiency which a man must attain in order to earn the current wages of the district is high. If then a member of the union at Bristol cannot get 28s. a week, he will be forbidden to work for less there, but the union will pay the expense of his going, say, to Taunton where he will be able to get employment at the current wages. On the other hand an exceptionally able carpenter in Taunton is likely to migrate to Bristol or London to get higher wages. By thus sending inefficient men to places where the standard of efficiency is low, and indirectly at least helping efficient men to go to places where it is high, unions help to perpetuate, if not to intensify, local inequalities of efficiency and therefore local inequalities of Time-wages.

Secondly with regard to piece-work. Where the work varies in character from day to day, so that no tariff can be agreed upon for it, the unions object to the system of piece-work. For under it the workman must be left unaided to make his bargain with his employer for each separate job: unless indeed he has to bargain with a piece-master who contracts with the employer to find the labour for doing a certain job1. Of the two the latter plan is the more distasteful to the unions; but they object to both. However even where no tariff can be fixed, the system of piece-work is making its way in spite of the opposition of the unions. For the ablest and strongest masters generally insist on it as necessary to enable them to carry out their plans freely, and to get their men to use their best energies; and such employers naturally beat in the race those who yield to the unions on this and other points. Where a tariff can be agreed upon, the unions do not generally oppose the system of piece-work. Piece-work is adopted almost universally in trades that make goods for exportation, partly because in many of them tariffs can easily be framed, partly because the stress of competition is severest in these trades.

1 This plan must not be confounded with the system under which a sub-contract is taken by a gang of workmen with one of their members to act as spokesman. This system is a form of co-operation, and is not objected to by unions. See Book III. ch. ix.

Unionists however maintain that the system of piece-work sometimes makes men overwork and become prematurely old, and that it causes work to be done badly. These disadvantages really exist in a few trades, though seldom to any great extent. They say further that by increasing the amount of work done by each man it decreases the demand for labour, and so lowers wages. If the resistance to piece-work on this ground extends to all trades, it is an attempt to diminish production, and therefore to diminish the Wages-and-profits Fund, and therefore it can have no other end than that of diminishing wages generally: for there is no such thing as general overproduction1. If however it is confined to one trade, the temporary scarcity of labour in that trade may in a few cases cause it to gain at the expense of others. But this gain can only be temporary and must involve a greater injury to others2.

§ 11. Exactly the same three disadvantages are said to be inherent in long hours of labour. A man who labours habitually twelve or fourteen hours a day at work from which he gets no enjoyment might almost as well not live; it is better that he should work less and earn less. Unions desire that the Normal day's work should be short; and that when a man works overtime he should be paid at a higher rate than for his Normal day. This plan would contribute much to the moral and social progress of the world. But its general adoption is hindered by the fact that where it has been introduced, the best workmen often insist on working overtime in order to earn high wages; so that an employer who does not habitually work overtime, loses his best men. This is a case in which the collective will of the union is overridden by the individual wills of its members.

Another obstacle to its adoption is that a continually increasing part of the outlay of the employer consists of interest on Fixed capital, and a sinking fund to replace such machinery as is superseded by new inventions. This part of his outlay is independent of the number of hours in the day's work. It is to be feared that English workmen will not succeed in obtaining more rest and recreation without a great sacrifice of their incomes, unless they overcome their repugnance to one heroic remedy. That remedy is the gradual adoption of double shifts in trades in which much Fixed capital is employed. Many manufacturers admit that if they could get two sets of men to work their machinery for eight hours a day each, they could afford to pay the men as high daily wages for the eight hours' work as they now pay for ten hours, and yet make a better

1 See Book III. ch. i. § 4.

2 See Book III. ch. vii.