PREFACE

AMONG the facts which justify publishing a revised edition of this work the following may be mentioned: First, the large number of persons who have professed to have gained specific and long-needed help from the first edition suggests there may be many others who will be similarly benefited. Secondly, the uniform and almost sole objection to the book, made by readers and reviewers, has been that its "too closely packed and condensed" argumentation makes it "hard to read." The objection demands something to facilitate the reader's grasp of its important though subtle themes. This revision seeks to supply this need by expanding over-compact statements and more explicitly indicating the relation betwixt chapters. Thirdly, besides the high appreciation which the work has received by its careful readers in general the author has derived special encouragement from the very high estimate placed upon it by distinguished thinkers and critics, among whom have been Gladstone, Iverach, and Watkinson, in Great Britain; Drs. Spaulding, Bowne, and Magoun, and Bishops Hamilton and Fowler, in America; with Drs. Stuntz and Smith, in Asiatic missions. Fourthly, from the many requests we have received to publish a revised edition, from persons whose judgment we cannot but profoundly respect, we are convinced that the demand for the work, though not wide, will be continuous, and, perhaps, will increase with the progress of thought.

This book was originally written as the author's answer to himself of questions which had been shirked, slurred over, or inadequately answered by every writer and

speaker he had read or heard on these themes. It pertains to the foundation convictions; asks, and aims to answer, the question, What must I think?

In the plan of the work the Introduction seeks a clear understanding of what is meant by the question, What is truth? and how it may be validly answered; and, What are legitimate bounds of human inquiry? This leads to the view that whatever is necessarily implied in the fact of being must be truth; hence, Part First is an inquiry into the "Implications of Being."

In this inquiry it appears that the fact of existence, or being, is the first fact concerning which the question is met, What must I think? And as perception is our first mental act our first query is, What is our perception of being? Hence, our first chapter is entitled “Being, as Perceived."

As the next mental step following perception, in the process of knowing, is forming a conception, or idea, of things which we have perceived, we proceed in the second chapter to discriminate what conception of being we must form; or, rather, what conception naturally or necessarily arises upon the mind from our perception of being. Therefore Chapter II is given the title, “Being, as Conceived."

Chapter III, entitled "Being, as Conditioned," is mainly a continuation of the second chapter, but more in detail, and closes with a summing-up in twenty-three propositions giving a more full and rounded statement of our conception of being. These three chapters involve what the author regards as the only philosophy of which he is aware that is successful in the sense that it clearly discriminates the "primary unit" which, in its evolution, expands into a valid system which covers and accounts

Part Second, "Implications of Love," takes up love which in Part First appears as the nature of the "primary unit" and exhibits it as the originating and conditioning force which in its evolution is working out the problem of a personal universe, free, harmonious, and good.

While Part First involves a system of ontology (science of being), Part Second discloses a system of cosmology (theory of the world), together constituting a system of evolution, or constructive philosophy, which regards systems of physical evolution as merely incidental, whether true or false, and renders theodicy (vindication of God) superfluous. Of course, psychology and natural science are recognized and employed in the work by way of analysis or illustration, and the structural sciences, theology and ethics, are affected by its conclusions. The Bible, though quoted occasionally by way of apt expression or illustration, is not employed in the argument.

INTRODUCTION

SUPERSTITION, OPINION, DISCRIMINATION! Three epochal words! The first has had its day, the second its noon, the dawn of discrimination is upon us. The spirit of our day indulges no remark with more complacency than this: "The age of superstition is past." Though a doubt may exist as to whether superstition is vanquished or has only changed its forms, we may safely believe it broken in some departments of life and largely superseded in others. But it may be well to observe what has taken its place as the mental temper in modern culture. But slight inspection is needed to convince us that the ground once held by superstition is now occupied by partisan opinion. Just as in ancient days a few tall spirits discerned great, dominating truths, set in a narrow horizon of intelligence, so now comparatively few discriminate the solid ground of verified accuracy from the quagmire and quicksands of opinion. Not unfrequently we hear the most valid truths questioned, and the crudest opinions positively asserted; and how rarely found is he who, having ascertained real knowledge in one department of thought, is wise enough to refrain from oracular speech in other, though unstudied, departments. It is much more easy to a lazy, dishonest, or cowardly man to accept as knowledge the assertion of smart or ponderous opinion than to undergo a painstaking ascertainment of truth. The honesty required in the search for truth seems as rare a quality now as in the days when superstition held the place now occupied by flippant opinion.

Yes, the domination of superstition is past, the reign of opinion is upon us; when will the age of discrimina