ing love as the nature of God-is not a necessity nor a condition to God's egoistic perfection. But, on the contrary, his perfect being in its independent altruistic freedom is the condition and opportunity which account for the objective nature of the universe; account for the universe as other than God. Love, the only thinkable nature of an unconditioned being, affords, in its perfect altruistic freedom, the only thinkable condition which is adequate to the projectment of objective being. Here we shake off the last shred of pantheistic philosophy, Hindoo, Greek, and German.

Pantheism is but a confession of inability to think one's way out from infinite to finite being; and hence surrenders the solution of finite being and stultifies the individual self-consciousness of man. Whether as a theory that the universe is God, or God is the universe, or that God and the universe are necessarily coexisting phases of being, it cannot be held without contradiction. According to pantheism there is either no independent or no dependent being. Its teachers have failed to recognize unconditioned being as perfect action, failed to see that perfect action is perfectly devoted self-realization, failed to recognize this as infinite self-love, and failed to see that infinite selflove has infinite altruistic freedom; is infinite love and implies the infinite freedom of perfect unselfishness. They have made their failures by regarding the universe as in some way necessitated; regarding the infinite as in some way impelled or driven to methods of phenomena to attain self-consciousness. They have dragged the infinite into finite conditions, yet have accounted for nothing; or, like Fichte, have concluded that being is but a dream and human knowledge "but the dream of a dream."

the individual self-perception of man, not the reason why man or the universe exists, but the condition upon which they can exist. We find this condition to be the perfect altruistic freedom of that independent self-love which is the nature of God; a freedom which neither abridges, impels, nor determines, but illustrates infinite self-love, the unconditioned nature of an ego whose perfection is not susceptible to impairment through endless altruistic determination. We find in this unconditioned love no necessity nor compulsion to altruistic benevolence. Compulsion would cancel benevolence. We find nothing in God's objective action that is a condition to his perfect self-determination. We find, simply, an infinite love which needs no indirect methods by which to achieve perfect self-determination as man needs, but which in its direct, unrelated, independent realization of perfect being is perfection for himself, and is, hence, capable of perfect beneficence to others; and this love is identical, in its egoistic independence, with perfect self-love, the self-sustained egoism which is adequate to endless altruism. This is perfect altruistic freedom, as implied in infinite egoistic love.

We have said that a perfect, that is, a perfectly free, altruism is, to our thought, the highest exponent of egoistic perfection. But this does not imply that egoistic perfection is determined by means of it; but it does imply that egoistic perfection is self-sufficient, self-secure, infinitely free to determine love's altruistic benefaction, without subjective reserve, forever. Thus love appears to our thought as determining a higher and a lower life-the higher life of independent being, the lower life of finite self-determination in relation to dependent being. The higher is the perfection of unconditioned, the lower is the

Then let it be steadily held in view that the grand demand upon our system of philosophy is to account for our personal existence; and that this fact is accounted. for in finding in independent self-love the freedom to create or not create; and in either case to be self-determined perfection in himself. The perceived fact of our dependent existence evinces that he chooses to create; his freedom so to choose offers a full account of our existence-a full account of "being, as conditioned."

The reason why he chooses to create dependent being is not concerned in this question, nor in any way needed that we may see the coexistence of conditioned with unconditioned action in God, or the coexistence of conditioned beings with the unconditioned One. "The reason why" concerns the intention, or meaning, of our existence, but not the fact. Doubtless, pantheistic theories are prompted from supposing that dependent being must be accounted for by showing some necessity for it, and hence place that necessity in a necessitated unit which may be termed either God or universe, and of which dependent beings are but temporary phenomena. Thus self-conscious, dependent beings, which is the grand problem to be solved, is not solved, but ignored.

Now that we see in self-love's perfect self-determination the freedom of the unconditioned ego to determine an objective system of being, in harmony with that love, we might offer the implied reason why he chooses so to do. But we defer this to the discussion of "Implications of Love," Part Second.

X. The Altruistic Spirit. It is impossible for us to think of that Person who is immutably perfect-perfect for the infinite good and pleasure of his own being, and perfect to afford the highest good of other possible beings

being choose to form a conception of a perfect system of dependent being, that conception must be thought as dependent upon him and conditioned by him; it is a conditioned conception, while his nature is unconditioned. Perfectly self-determined being must be thought as perfectly unconditioned love; and must be thought such before he can be thought capable of perfect altruism. If we but bear in mind that love is purely self-determining action we cannot fail to see that its highest mode is subjective, egoistic. And if we strictly adhere to this pure notion of love, the supreme devotement of perfect selfdetermination, we shall have no difficulty in seeing that in an independent being it must realize perfect self-determination without need of objective instrumentality.

Perfect self-determination must be thought absolute in knowledge and power; hence, can actualize perfection directly, not conditioned by time, space, or means. It is not dependent upon objects of love as indirect means of realizing perfection. Dependent persons, such as we are, must be led to apprehend our ideal self and actualize it in our highest determination of character by means of altruistic methods. "We must lose our lives that we may find them." All our love for others reacts to achieve our best selves, and thus proves to be pure self-love purged of selfishness. And this pure self-love, which is the best possible for ourselves, is realized by our being the best possible for others. This exhibits the subjective oneness of love and self-love-exhibits the unselfish freedom of a perfect self-love, pure altruism.

But as the independent self-love of God is directly selfdetermined, it is independently the best for himself, and independently capable of being the best for a dependent universe. Hence, it is clear that altruistic determination

determinable beings. Take the practical good which God knows there is in the satisfaction of love, and the practical good to other beings which love may secure in the realization of the several ideals which may be comprehended in an ideal objective life as a whole, and we have the benevolent element in love's altruistic tendency. This altruistic tendency, or spontaneity, is the altruistic spirit in the second above-described sense of the term "spirit"; a benevolent sentiment, expression, or spontaneity flowing out from love, the divine nature.

But this is only a spontaneity, not a determination unless it consciously prompts toward objective action. If it so prompt, instigate, it is then a form of self-conscious determination, a definite personality; an objectively selfdirected energy; "the altruistic spirit" in the sense of a self-determined person.

But now, if we think of this altruistic spirit as an intentionally exercised determination or prompting toward objective exploitation, we must discriminate it as the rise. of a definite form of consciousness, determined by the independent one, and distinguished by at least two welldefined characteristics. These are (1) conscious sentiment for, and contemplation of, an objective life; and hence, because related to an object, must be distinguished from the absolute consciousness of the perfectly selfdetermined one. (2) Self-consciousness as a concrete prompting or urging sentiment; hence, because concrete and informal, it is distinct, in thought, from any formal consciousness, as, for example, that of the Logos, the Son. We cannot escape the affirmation that a definite prompting of the divine nature toward objective action— action which shall be related to possible or real objects— is a consciously related prompting, and is consciously