We may here observe farther, that it is in SERM. itself fit and reasonable, that God, the one IV. eternal being, perfect and happy in himself, if he forms a world, or worlds of beings, should concern himself for them, provide for them, and over-rule and direct all things with wisdom, righteousnesse and goodnesse. Thus then, virtue, or moral righteousnesse, is, and appears to be, in itself fit and reasonable, and has a tendence to promote the happinesse of particular beings, and of focieties. 4. This fitnesse and reasonablenesse of things is itself an obligation: or lays an obligation upon every rational being, by whom it is perceived. For whatever is fit, reasonable and equitable, must be right, and the contrarie wrong. He therefore that does what is fit, reasonable, and equitable, and which he discerns to be right, approves himself, and his conduct, and has fatisfaction therein. He that does otherwise, knows he has done wrong: and, if he reflect, will condemn himself. 5. Befide the forementioned obligation, (of intrinfic fitnesse and reasonablenesse,) there is another, arising from the will of God, the G creator IV. SERM. creator and the governour of the universe, and particularly of his rational creatures. These fitnesses of things, before-mentioned, are a rule of action to the Deity himself. And it must be his will, that the fitnesse, or reason, of things should be observed by his rational creatures: or that they should do those things, which are conducive to their own, and each others welfare. And when it is considered, that moral good is the will of God, and moral evil contrarie to his will; even to the will of him, who is fupreme, and Lord of all; it is reafonable to conclude, that he should bestow rewards or inflict punishments, either now immediatly, or hereafter in some future time, upon those who observe or neglect the reason of things and the welfare of their fellow-creatures: that is, who obey, or tranfgress the law of nature: which is also the law of God, the author of nature. 6. Virtue, morality, or moral righteoufneffe, is a thing of great extent, comprehending every thing that is in itself fit and reasonable: mens duty to God and to each other: the duties of every relation, and the due re- ' gulation 1 ১ 1 gulation of thoughts and affections, as well as SERM. outward actions. - For in the more ordinarie and just sense of the expreffion, as before shewn, it takes in every thing that is fit and reasonable : and therefore must include honorable sentiments, as well as outward worship, and reverential expreffions concerning the Deity. It requires likewise kind affection, as well as good of fices, to men. It comprehends not only strict justice, but goodnesse, and mercie, and equity: yea forgivenesse of injuries and offenses, when acknowledged. For this also is fit in a world of creatures, that are weak and fallible, and often offend against each other, through mistake, or paffion. : This law of nature, or reason, does moreover teach repentance to all those who offend. For, fince virtue is right, as before shewn, he who has transgressed, and done what is wrong, must turn from his course, and amend it. It is the only way of becoming good, and of being accepted in the fight of the holy, wife and impartial fovereign and judge of all. 7. It is commonly faid of the law of nature, that it is of eternal obligation: but yet I would G2 IV. 1 SERM, I would add, that every branch of moral righteousnesse cannot be practised in every state. IV. The law of reason, I say, is of eternal obligation: that is, supposing such cases and circumftances, or beings to bear such and such relations to each other; fuch and such actions will be always obligatorie. Supposing a world, in which there are parents and children, masters and servants, rich and poor, fome in profperous, others in afflictive circumstances, some governours, others governed, and a great variety of other circumstances subsisting: fuch and such a behaviour toward each other is fit and reasonable. And though there be no such beings, with those several relations; yet it is true, that if there were such beings, such actions would be in themselves fit and reasonable. Nor can any authority dissolve, and set aside their obligation. Thus these things are of everlasting obligation. But when those relations and circumstances cease, divers branches of duty must cease also. So in a future state of recompense, for such as have been truly and fincerely good in this world, many branches of duty, neceffarie here, will cease. Where there is perfect holineffe, and perfection of happinesse, there cannot be the exercise of forgivenesse to offen- SERM. ders, nor of mercie to the miferable. Nor IV. will there be room for patience under afflictions, and such like virtues which are neceffarie in this state of frailty: though still the love of God, and the love of each other, the great and essential virtues, with branches fuitable to a state of glorie and happinesse, will be always fit, and reasonable, and incumbent upon every one. cannot 8. The duties of moral obligation are difcernible by rational beings, with a due exercise of their powers and faculties. For those duties being founded in the powers and circumstances of those very beings themselves, and their relations to each other, and being therefore fit and reafonable in themselves; they may be difcerned by fuch as exercise their reason, and attend to the nature, and circumstances of things. There may be perplexed cases, when what is duty, what is best and fittest cannot be determined without some difficulty: and the evidence of what is right amounts to no more than probability, or is short of certainty. But the general obligations of virtue, the great 2 branches of duty, toward God and men, are G3 dif |