v.

to his legitimate child. If, under that act, the ap- 1820. pellants were legitimated, in 1787, they, thereby, Stevenson's could not prejudice the rights of Richard. Their Heirs new capacity was altogether prospective. From Sullivant. that day, they enjoyed a character to inherit rights which might thereafter accrue; and, in relation to those rights, we do not see what bearing the time of their father's death has upon the question. In the case of Sleighs v. Strider, W. Hall devised land to his son, R. Hall, for life; and after to his eldest son and his heirs forever: but if no male issue, to his eldest daughter and her heirs. Richard Hall had an illegitimate son born in 1776: in 1778 he married the mother, and recognised the son till his death, in 1796. He had also daughters after the marriage. It was determined that the son was legitimated, by the act of 1785, and entitled under the devise from his grandfather. It would seem, from the dictum of Judge Roane, that if Richard Hall had died before the 1st of January, 1787, the grandson never could have been legitimated. Whether he could or not, the eldest daughter must have taken. But suppose that the grandson had lived until 1788, and, in the lifetime of his father, had died leaving issue: would such issue, or the eldest daughter of Richard, have taken under the devise ? We maintain that the issue of the deceased son would have taken: from which we infer that the time of death is immaterial. The interpretation of the Virginia Courts can only be made rational and intelligible by rejecting the limitations suggested by the Chancellor and Judge

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Roane, and applying the statute to all persons within its literal meaning, without reference to the time of Heirs the recognition, or the death of the father. By this Sullivant. course, the new capacity, in all, will take date from the 1st of January, 1787, and will confer rights from that day only; as in cases that have arisen since the statute, the legitimate rights of the children, born before marriage, all take date from the marriage, without any reference to the time of recognition, or the death of the father.

2. We insist that the appellants, being the bastard brothers and sisters of Richard on the part of the mother, are his heirs at law. The law of 1785 contains this provision: "Bastards also shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance, on the part of the mother, in like manner as if lawfully begotten of such mother." In adopting a rule for the interpretation of this provision, we insist, in the language of the court, in the case of Stones v. Keeling," that "the act relates to the disposition of property only; and proceeds to show who shall be admitted to share the property of a person dying intestate, notwithstanding any former legal bar to a succession thereto; and in that light the law ought to receive the most liberal construction; it being evidently the design of the legislature, to establish the most liberal and extensive rules of succession to estates, in favour of all, in whose favour the intestate himself, had he made a will, might have been supposed to be influenced." It gives to bastards a full

Heirs v.

and complete capacity of inheritance, through the 1820. maternal line, both lineal and collateral. By nothing Stevensons' short of this can the terms of the law be satisfied. It is said, however, that the terms of the law are Sullivant. fully satisfied when it is extended to inheritance direct, between the bastard and the mother; thus excluding collateral descents between bastards altogether. This doctrine is founded upon an entirely erroneous rule of construction.. It is assumed that the statute being an innovation upon the common law, must be construed strictly, and extended only so far as the letter absolutely requires. The Virginia Courts, in the cases referred to, have adopted a different rule; and a rule more consonant to reason and justice, and to our free and equal principles of government. The incapacities of bastards grew out of the feudal system, and originated in the dispositions of the feudal lords to multiply escheats and forfeitures. Most undoubtedly it was the intention of the Virginia legislature, to cut up the whole system root and branch. If bastards cannot inherit from a legitimate brother, they cannot inherit from each other. Neither can they inherit from, or transmit inheritance to, uncles, grandfathers, or any collateral relative whatever. By the same rule, legitimate brothers and sisters cannot inherit from bastards, or their descendants. And if this be the case, who can say that bastards are capable of inheriting "and transmitting inheritance, on the part of the mother, in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother."

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Mr. Doddridge, contra, stated, 1. that in examinStevenson's ing the appellants' claim to hold the lands in question, Heirs as the legal representatives of Hugh Stephenson, Sullivant. under his will, he would contend, what indeed seem

v.

ed to be admitted on the other side, that Richard Stephenson took by purchase from the State, and that Hugh never had an interest in the subject, legal or equitable, which he could devise, or which could pass from him in a course of descents If this be so, it would certainly follow, that upon the death of Richard, under age and without issue, after having survived his mother, the estate passed from him to his heirs general, according to the letter of the act directing the course of descents, as the appellants' counsel contend, and without reference to the channel through which he obtained it. But we shall insist, that according to the equity of the 5th section of the act of descents, the land passed to the fraternal kindred.

One of the laws of Virginia on the subject of land bounties refers to them, as having been " promised by ordinance of Convention." This circumstance made a search for that ordinance necessary. There were three sessions of a Convention held in the year 1775. By an act of the last, the Convention of 1776 was regularly elected. The present controversy has had the effect of collecting the journals of both Conventions. They are now, for the first time, published. A perusal of them will show, that the Conventions, although they provided for raising troops, never made a promise of land bounty to any description of the public forces. Indeed, until they declared the State inde

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pendent, they had asserted no claim whatever to the crown lands, such a promise would have appeared absurd. The first mention of a land bounty will be found in the acts of the first regular General Assembly at Sullivants their October session in 1776, chapters 11. and 21. enacted after the death of Hugh Stevenson. The practice of giving bounties in land was followed up by the acts of October, 1778, с. 45, May, 1779, c. 6., and the manner of carrying them into grant was provided for by the acts of May, 1779, c. 18. and of October 1779, c. 21. But these laws having omitted to provide for the heirs of those who were, or should be, lost in the service, two others were passed. By the first a promise was made to the officers and soldiers, then living, in these words: " and when any officer, soldier, or sailor, shall have fallen, or died in the service, his heirs or legal representatives shall be entitled to, and receive, the same quantity of land as would have been due to such officer, soldier or sailor, respectively, had he been living." The second is in the following words, (comprehending the case of H Stevenson :) "That the legal representatives of any officer, on continental or State establishment, who may have died in the service, before the bounty in lands promised by this or any former act, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same in like manner as the officer himself might have done if living. It is observable, that the latter act only respects the heir of an officer who had fallen before any land bounty was promised