Loughborough v. 'The words in which those clauses are expressed im- 1820. port this intention. In thus regulating its exercise, a rule is given in the 2d section of the first article for its application to the respective States. That Blake. rule declares how direct taxes upon the States shall be imposed. They shall be apportioned upon the several States according to their numbers. If, then, a direct tax be laid at all, it must be laid on every State, conformably to the rule provided in the constitution. Congress has clearly no power to exempt any State from its due share of the burthen. But this regulation is expressly confined to the States, and creates no necessity for extending the tax to the district or territories. The words of the 9th section do not in terms require, that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the States. They, therefore, may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them. It could scarcely escape the members of the convention, that the expense of executing the law in a territory might exceed the amount of the tax. But be this as it may, the doubt created by the words of the 9th section, relates to the obligation to apportion a direct tax on the territories as well as the States, rather than to the power to do so. If, then, the language of the constitution be construed to comprehend the territories and district of Columbia, as well as the States, that language confers on Congress the power of taxing the district 1820. and territories as well as the States. If the general Loughbo- language of the constitution should be confined to rough the States, still the 16th paragraph of the 8th section gives to Congress the power of exercising "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever within this district." v. Blake. The power of exclusive le the district includes the power of imposing taxes. On the extent of these terms, according to the gislation over common understanding of mankind, there can be no difference of opinion; but it is contended, that they must be limited by that great principle which was asserted in our revolution, that representation is inseparable from taxation. The difference between requiring a continent, with an immense population, to submit to be taxed by a government having no common interest with it, separated from it by a vast ocean, restrained by no principle of apportionment, and associated with it by no common feelings; and permitting the representatives of the American people, under the restrictions of our constitution, to tax a part of the society, which is either in a state of infancy advancing to manhood, looking forward to complete equality so soon as that state of manhood shall be attained, as is the case with the territories; or which has voluntarily relinquished the right of representation, and has adopted the whole body of Congress for its legitimate government, as is the case with the district, is too obvious not to present itself to the minds of all. Although in theory it might be more congenial to the spirit of our institutions to admit a representative from the district, it may be doubted whether, in fact, its interests would be rendered thereby the more secure; and certainly the constitution does 1820. not consider their want of a representative in Congress as exempting it from equal taxation. If it were true that, according to the spirit of our constitution, the power of taxation must be limited by the right of representation, whence is derived the right to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, within this district? If the principles of liberty, and of our constitution, forbid the raising of revenue from those who are not represented, do not these principles forbid the raising it by duties, imposts, and excises, as well as by a direct tax? If the principles of our revolution give a rule applicable to this case, we cannot have forgotten that neither the stamp act nor the duty on tea were direct taxes. Yet it is admitted, that the constitution not only allows, but enjoins the government to extend the ordinary revenue system to this district. If it be said, that the principle of uniformity, established in the constitution, secures the district from oppression in the imposition of indirect taxes, it is not less true, that the principle of apportionment, also established in the constitution, secures the district from any oppressive exercise of the power to lay and collect direct taxes. After giving this subject its serious attention, the Court is unanimously of opinion, that Congress possesses, under the constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the constitution, and that there is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court. Judgment afiirmed. Loughborough Blake, v. 1820. Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia. (COMMON LAW.) MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA v. THE BANK OF COLUMBIA. The 17th section of the act, incorporating the Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, providing "that all bills, bonds, notes, and every other contract or engagement on behalf of the corporation, shall be signed by the President, and countersigned by the Cashier; and the funds of the corporation shall in no case be liable for any contract or engagement, unless the same shall be signed and countersigned as aforesaid," does not extend to contracts and undertakings implied in law. Where a check was drawn by a person who was the cashier of an incorporated Bank, and it appeared doubtful upon the face of the instrument, whether it was an official or a private act, parol evidence was admitted to show that it was an official act. The act of agents do not derive their validity from professing on the face of them to have been done in the exercise of their agency. The liability of the principal depends upon the facts, 1st. That the act was done in the exercise, and, 2dly. Within the limits of the power delegated. In ascertaining these facts, as connected with the execution of any written instrument, parol testimony is admissible. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the defendants in error against the plaintiffs in error, on the following check: MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA. No. 18. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1820. June 25th, 1817. Mechanics' v. CASHIER of the Bank of Columbia, Pay to the order of P. H. Minor, Esq. Ten Thousand Dollars. $10,000 WM. PATON, Jr. This check was offered in evidence by the plaintiff below, and testimony to prove that the said Paton, before, at the time, and subsequent to the drawing of the said check, was cashier of the said Mechanics' Bank, and the said Minor the teller thereof; and in order to prove that the said check was drawn by the said William Paton in his capacity as cashier, and was so understood by him, and so understood by the said Bank of Columbia, their officers and servants; evidence was further offered to prove, that from the 5th of May, 1817, to the time of drawing the said check, there was kept in the said Mechanics' Bank, by the proper officer thereof, a book of printed checks in blank, for the purpose of being used by the cashier, in drawing his official checks; and that the check in question had been cut out of the said book: That the said Cashier, in his official character, had frequently used the blank checks out of the said book, in drawing upon other banks in the district, and there was no other difference between the checks so drawn, and the check in question, other than the letters "Cas." or "Ca." being superadded to the name of the said William Paton, Jun. in the checks Bank of Columbia. |