friend that I have in the world should beg of me with the greateft opportunity; or any man that hath the greatest authority over me, should lay his severest commands upon me to believe a thing, for which I see no reafon, I could not do it; because nothing can command affent, but evidence. So that he that would perfuade men to believe either the principles of natural religion, or any divine revelation, must convince them of the truth of them, for it is unreasonable to defire a man to believe any thing, unless I give him good reason why he should.

And this being the proper course which is to be taken, there are two forts of perfons to whom I shall apply myself in this exhortation: those who do not believe. these things; and those who are perfuaded of them: to: the former, in order to the begetting of faith in them; to the latter, in order to the strengthening and confirme ing of their faith.

Those who do not believe, are of two forts; either such as do positively disbelieve these things, and make it their business to arm themselves against them with: all the arguments they can; who are so far from believing a God, or any divine revelation, that they endeavour to perfuade themselves of the contrary, that there is no fuch thing; or else they are such as are indifferent: about these matters. They have received the principles of religion by their education, and they have nothing to say against them, nor for them; they never confidered them, nor the proper confequences of them; they neither believe nor disbelieve them upon any fonable account..

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Now all these are to be dealt withal in the fame. way: for whatever will convince the disbeliever, will much more perfuade the indifferent, and confirm the weak. For faith is to be strengthened by the fame arguments whereby it is wrought. Therefore I shall apply myself to convince unbelievers; and every one: may apply those arguments which I use to this pur. pose, for the strengthening of their own faith.

But before I come to those arguments I intend to of fer for the conviction of those that do not believe, I think it convenient to endeavour, if possible, to remove a

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violent, and, I think, unreasonable prejudice which men have received against all those who endeavour to make religion reasonable. As if Bellarmine had been in the right, when he said, That faith was rather to be defined by ignorance than by knowledge. The plain English of which is, that it is for want of understanding that men believe the gospel; and if the world were but a little more knowing and wife, no body would be a Christian. I know not how it comes to pass, whether through the artifice of the Popish party, who hate the light, left it fhould reprove them, and make them manifest; ; or through the ignorance of too many well-meaning Proteftants; I say, I know not how it comes to pass, but so it is, that every one that offers to give a reasonable account of his faith, and to establish religion upon rational principles, is presently branded for a Socinian; of which we have a sad instance in that incomparable person Mr. Chillingworth, the glory of this age and nation, who for no other cause that I know of, but his worthy and successful attempts to make Christian religion reasonable, and to discover those firm and folid foundations upon which our faith is built, hath been requited with this black and odious character. But if this be Socinianifm, for a man to enquire into the grounds and reasons of Chri. stian religion, and to endeavour to give a fatisfactory account why he believes it, I know no way but that all confiderate, inquisitive men, that are above fancy and enthusiasm, must be either Socinians or Atheists.

I cannot imagine how men can do greater disservice to religion, than by taking it off from the rational and folid bafis upon which it stands, and bearing the world in hand, that men ought to believe without reason; for this is to turn faith into credulity, and to level Chriftian religion with the vilest and most groundless enthusiasms that ever were in the world. Indeed if we had only to deal with Henry Nicholas, and Jacob Behman, who fight against us in the dark, not with reasons and arguments, but with infignificant words, and obfcure phrafes; we might make a shift to bear up against them with this principle, and we might charge them to believe us, as they do us to believe them, without giving them any reason for it: but if we were to deal with Celfus, VOL. IX.

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or Julian, or Porphyry, or some of our modern Atheists, we should foon find how vain it would be to go about to cajole them with phrases, and to gain them over to Christianity, by telling them that they must deny their reason, and lay aside their understandings, and believe they know not why. If the great pillars of Christianity, the ancient Fathers, had taken this course in their apologies for Christian religion, it had never triumphed over Judaism and Paganism as it did; and whoever hath read over those defences and vindications of Christian religion against Jews and Heathens, which were written in the first ages of the church, especially the books of Origen against Celfus, and Eufebius his book de Demonst. and Preparat. Evangel. shall find that they did very folicitoufly endeavour to fatisfy the world, by all rational ways, both of the truth and reasonableness of Chriftian religion. And if that was a good way then, it is so now; and never more necessary than in this age, which I fear hath as many Atheists and infidels, that go under the name of Christians, as ever were in any age since Christian religion was first planted in the world.

But my design at present is not to perfuade men particularly to the belief of Christianity, (that I intend hereafter, by God's assistance, to speak to) but to perfuade men to the belief of religion in general. So that all that I shall do at present, shall be, as briefly as I can, to offer some arguments and confiderations to perfuade men to the belief of the principles of natural religion, and of the revelation which God hath made of his mind and will in the scripturės.

I. To perfuade men to believe the principles of natural religion, such as the being of a God; the immortality of the foul; and future rewards after this life; I shall offer these two confiderations.

First, That it is most reasonable so to do.
Secondly, That it is infinitely most prudent.

First, As to the being of God. Do but confider these two things which are undeniable; that there is a world, however it came; and that mankind do generally confent in a confident perfuafion that there is a God, whatever be the cause of it. Now these two things being certain, and not liable to any question, let us enquire whe

whether a reasonable account can be given of these without a God.

1. Supposing there be no God, how came this vast and orderly frame of the world? There are but two ways that can be imagined. Either it was from eternity always of itself; or it began some time to be. That it should be always of itself; though it may be imagined of the heavens, and the earth, which, as to the main, are permanent, and continue the fame; yet in things that fucceed one after another, it is altogether unimaginable. As in the generation of men, there can be no doubt, whether every one of them was from another, or fome of themselves. Some of them must be of themselves; for whatever number of causes be imagined in orderly fuccession, some of them must have no cause, but be of themselves. Now that which is of itfelf, and the cause of all others, is the first. So that there must be a first man; and the age of man being finite, this first man must have a beginning. So that an infinite succession of men should have been, is impoffible; and confequently that men were always. But I need not infift much upon this, because few or none of our modern Atheists pitch upon this way. Besides that Ariftotle, who is reputed the great afferter of the eternity of the world, doth acknowledge an infinite progrefs and fuccession of causes to be one of the greatest absurdities.

Suppose then the world began some time to be; it must either be made by counsel and design; that is, produced by some being that knew what it did, that did contrive and frame it as it is, which it is easy to conceive a being that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful, might do; but this is to own a God: or else the matter of it being being supposed to have been always, and in continual motion and tumult, it at last happened to fall into this order, and the parts of matter, after various agitations, were at length entangled and knit together in this order, in which we see the world to be. But can any man think this reasonable to imagine, that in the infinite variety which is in the world, all things should happen by chance, as well and as orderly as the greatest wisdom could have contrived them?

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them? Whoever can believe this, must do it with his will, and not with his understanding.

But seeing it must be granted that something is of itself; how easy is it to grant such a being to be of itself, as hath other perfections proportionable to neceffary existence, that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful? And there will be no dificulty in conceiving how such a being as this could make the world.

2. This likewife is undeniable, that mankind do generally confent in a confident perfuafion that there is a God, whatever was the cause of this. Now the reason of so universal a consent in all places and ages of the world, must be one and constant: but no one and constant reason of this can be given, unless it be from the frame and nature of man's mind and understanding, which hath the notion of a deity stampt upon it, or, which is all one, hath such an understanding, as will in its own free use and exercise find out a God. And what more reasonable than to think, that if we be God's workmanship, he should set this mark of himself upon us, that we might know to whom we belong? And I dare say, that this account must be much more reafonable and fatisfactory to any indifferent man, than to resolve this universal consent into tradition, or statepolicy, both which are liable to inexplicable difficulties, as * I have elsewhere shewn at large.

II. As to the immortality of the foul. Supposing a God, who is an infinite Spirit, it is easy to imagine the possibility of a finite spirit: and supposing the goodness of God, no man can doubt, but that when he made all things, he would make some best: and the same goodness which moved him to make things, would be a reafon to continue those things for the longest duration they are capable of.

III. As to future rewards. Supposing the holiness and justice of God, that he loves righteousness, and hates iniquity; and that he is the Magistrate and Governour of the world, and concerned to countenance goodness and discourage fin; and confidering the promiscuous dispensation of his providence in this world, and how all things

* See Vol. 1. Serm, I, where the arguments here briefly named are handled at large.