globe, inferior to none other in native wealth? Her fisheries, separately taken, would yield more; or her mines, or her timber, or her drugs, her indigo, or her sugar, or her cotton.

I am then stedfast in my belief, that the capabilities of Africa would furnish full compensation to that country for the loss of the Slave Trade. It may sound visionary at the present time, but I expect that at some future, and not very distant day, it will appear, that for every pound she now receives from the export of her people, a hundred pounds' worth of produce, either for home consumption or foreign commerce, will be raised from the fertility of her soil.

It is something to know that there is a natural and an infallible remedy for the distractions of Africa, and that the remedy is within reach, were there but the sagacity to use it. It is another question, how we shall cause that remedy to be applied, and how we shall make manifest to the clouded perceptions of her people, the false economy of selling her effective strength, while her plains remain a desert, instead of employing that strength in transforming that desert into a fruitful and smiling land. Capabilities are nothing to the unreflecting mind of the savage he wants something present and tangible.

How then shall we undeceive her chiefs, and convince them, that it is for their interest that the Slave Trade should cease? This we must do for Africa:

we must elevate the minds of her people, and call forth the capabilities of her soil.

Bearing in mind, that every effort we make must be intended, either directly or remotely, to effect one, or other, or both of these objects, I now proceed to a detail of the remedial measures which it seems necessary to adopt.

CHAPTER I.

PREPARATORY MEASURES.

The first thing to be done, is to throw all possible impediments in the way of the Slave Trade, and to make it both more precarious and less profitable than it is at present.

In order to do this, our squadron must be rendered more efficient; and this it is supposed may be accomplished

1st. By concentrating on the coast of Africa the whole force employed in this particular service. It has been our practice hitherto to distribute a few ships along the African coast, while others cruise near South America and the West Indies. The former, though they have failed in suppressing the trade, have at all events done something towards the annoyance of the trader. The latter, with equal zeal, and a much larger force, have done little or nothing towards this object. On the average of the last four years to which the accounts extend, viz., 1834-5-6 and 7, we have had on the West Indian and South American stations 42 vessels of war; on the African station, 14. By the former there have been taken and adjudicated, in four years, 34 slavers; by the smaller squadron, 97.

I am not so ignorant as to infer that the Admi

U

ralty were in error in this distribution of their disposable force. I well know that other objects than the suppression of the Slave Trade demanded attention : as little do I presume to cast any reflection upon the naval officers in command. But from these facts I conceive I am entitled to draw the conclusion, that, as far as the Slave Trade is concerned, little or no benefit has been derived from the force stationed in the neighbourhood of Cuba and Brazil.

2dly. The efficiency of our squadron may be improved by an actual increase of the force.

I am aware that some gentlemen, seeing that all our past naval efforts have failed, are in favour of withdrawing our whole force, and of relying exclusively on other means; but it appears to me, that in order to try these other means with the most advantage, it is needful, for a time, to retain our force on the coast of Africa.

If at the moment when we are beginning to encourage agricultural industry, and to give an impulse to the minds of her people, our navy were to abandon the coast, there can be no doubt that it would be a signal to the chiefs of the country (still ignorant of the resources of their soil, and still supposing that the Slave Trade alone can supply them with the luxuries of Europe) to prosecute their horrid traffic with even more than their usual energy. They would avail themselves of the removal of the only check which they have hitherto felt, and at the very moment when our last ship departed from the

coast, Africa would present a scene of conflagration, massacre, and convulsion, such as even Africa has never before witnessed.

Can it be imagined that agriculture could thrive or the voice of the teacher receive attention, or the arts of peace take root, at such a moment? Having persevered so long and so unprofitably in the attempt to suppress the traffic by force, it would be a poor mode of repairing our error, to dismiss that force just at the time when we most required tranquillity, and when anything likely to give a new impulse to the Slave Trade would be peculiarly unseasonable.

It would appear to be a wiser policy to augment our force, and thus to multiply the risks, while we reduce the profits of the trade. We should try, if it were only for a given period, the full effect of what can be done by our maritime strength: instead of doling out, year by year, a force inadequate to our object, we should at this juncture strike a telling blow, so that the African, while measuring the advantages of that system which we wish him to abandon, against that which we desire to see adopted, may feel in its greatest force the weight of those hazards and discouragements which the British navy can interpose.

3dly. We may increase the efficiency of our squadron by the employment of steamers as part of the proposed reinforcement. I am, it must be confessed, but ill qualified to offer an opinion on a matter which comes rather within the province of