holy will *. Every the least deviation from it, by tranfgreffion, or neglect of duty, must still be evil in itself, and must still be seen, and esteemed to be so by the God of truth, who cannot lie. Now, is there any thing in the gospel that hath the least tendency to lessen the sense of this obligation, after it hath been once discovered? Very far from it: on the contrary, all that Christ hath done for the falvation of finners, as its immediate * Since mention has been made of perfect conformity to the will of God, or perfect obedience to his law, as the duty of man, which is indeed the foundation of this whole doctrine, I think it neceffary to observe, that fome deny this to be properly required of man, as his duty in the present fallen state, because he is not able to perform it. But such do not seem to attend either to the meaning of perfect obedience, or to the nature or caufe of this inability. Perfect obedience is obedience by any crea ture, to the utmost extent of his natural powers. Even in a state of innocence, the holy difpofitions of Adam would not have been equal in strength and activity to those of creatures of an higher rank: but surely to love God, who is infinitely amiable, with all the heart, and above all, to confecrate all his powers and faculties, without exception, and without intermiffion, to God's fervice, must be undeniably the duty of every intelligent creature. And what fort of inability are we under to pay this? Our natural faculties are furely as fit for the service of God as for any bafer purpose: the inability is only moral, and lies wholly in the averfion of cur hearts from fuch employment. Does this then take away the guilt? Must God relax his law because we are not willing to obey it? Confult even modern philosphers; and fuch of them as allow there is any such thing as vice, will tell you, that it lies in evil or misplaced affections. Will then that which is ill in itself excuse its fruits in any degree from guilt or blame? The truth is, notwithstanding the loud charge of licentiousness upon the truths of the gospel, there is no other system that ever I perused which preferves the obligation of the law of God in its strength: the most part of them, when throughly examined, just amount to this, that men are. bound, and that it is RIGHT and MEET and FIT that they hould be as good and as holy as they themselves incline. con F consequence, magnifies the law, and makes it honourable. • Perhaps it may be thought, that the releasing a finner from the sanction of the law, or the punishment incurred, by pardon purchased and bestowed, has this effect: and here it is, to be sure, that men, by their partial views, are apt to suppose the objection lies. But let us only reflect, that the obligation to duty and obedience to the Creator, hath been seen by a believer in the strongeft light, and must continue to be sensible. Will he then be induced to act in the face of a perceived obligation, by an instance of unspeakable mercy? Is this reasonable to suppose? or rather, is it not felf-contradictory and absurd? It is so far from being true, that this mercy disposes to obe dience, as a peculiar and additional motive, as I shall aftewards shew more fully in its proper place. In the mean time, it is self-evident, that it can be no hindrance. What leads us into error in this matter, is what happens sometimes in human af fairs. In a human government mercy, or a promise of impunity for past crimes, may enable, tho', even in that cafe, not incline a rebellious traitor to renew his wickedness. But this is a most unjust and partial view of the cafe, in which the very circumstance is wanting upon which the chief stress ought to be laid. Human laws reach only outward actions, because human knowledge is so imperfect, that it cannot discover the dispofition of the heart: and as all professions are not fincere, so kindness is often bestowed on improper objects. This kindness, however, though it may discover the impropriety, it cannot cause it. But make the fimilitude complete, and fee how it will lead us to determine. Suppose one who hath been in rebellion, deeply and inwardly convinced of the evil of rebellion, and his obligation to fubmiffion; suppose this conviction fo strong, that he confesseth the justice of the fentence condemning him to die, which is very consistent with a defire of life: will a pardon offered or intimated to such a person make him dif loyal? Is this its natural, nay, is it its possible effect? If it could be supposed to have any such consequence at all, it could only be in this diftant way, that pardon seems to leffen the sense of a judge's displeasure at the crime. But even this can have no place here, because sufficient care is taken to prevent any fuch abuse of it, by the substitution and vicarious sufferings of a Mediator. I cannot help obferving here, that the fimili tude above used will lead us to the discovery of one great cause of the objection against which I am reasoning. It arifes from that corruption of heart, and inward opposition to the law of God in its extent and purity, which is in all men by nature, and continues in all who are not renewed in the spirit of their minds. As they have a strong tendency and inclination to tranfgrefs the law where they dare, they are ready to think, that the hopes of impunity must encourage every one to a bold violation of it. And no doubt this would be true, if there could be any real esteem, or cordial acceptance of the gospel, without a previous conviction of the obligation of the law, and the guilt and demerit of every transgressor *. But fuppofing what is in truth the cafe with every believer, that there is a real and strong conviction of the obligation of the law of God upon every rational creature, which cannot be taken away; to imagine that the mercy of God in pardoning finners for Christ's sake will leffen or weaken the sense of this obligation, is a most manifest contradiction. On the contrary, fin must needs have received a mortal blow, the love of it must necessarily have been destroyed, before pardon in this way could be fought or obtained: so that the apostle might well say, "How shall we that " are dead to fin live any longer therein?" ✔In the second place, he who believes in Christ, and expects justification through his imputed righteousness, must have the deepest and strongest sense of the evil of fin in itself. This is in a good measure included, in, or an immediate consequence of, what has been already mentioned. For the obligation of the law, as hinted above, is but very imperfect, if we consider it only as founded on the power of God, and the dependence of the creature, and not alfo on the holiness, justice, and goodness of the law itself. In the first sense, perhaps, it may be felt by the wicked in this world, at least, we are fure, it is felt by devils and damned spirits in a feparate state. They know that they must suffer, because they will not obey. But where there is a complete sense of obligation, it implies a belief of the righteousness of the law, as well as the power of the law-giver, of the equity, nay, the excellence of the command, as well as the severity of the fanction. All such not only believe that God will punish for fin, but that it is most just that he should do so, and that fin has richly deserv **But this is impoffible: for tho' there may be fome fort of fear of punishment, occafioned by displays of divine power, where there is no true humiliation of mind, or genuine conviction of fin; this is but like the impatient struggles of a chained lave, instead of the willing subjection of a penitent child. There is still in all fuch an inward murmuring against the sentence, as that of an unjust and rigorous tyrant, and not of a righteous judge. Therefore, tho' such should pretend to rely on the merits of Chrift for pardon and deliverance, it is plainly not from their hearts, and therefore neither to the saving of their fouls, cor to the reformation of their lives. |